下面是小编为大家整理的2020上半年已崩！全球宏观数据观察报告,供大家参考。
Finally, the size and scope of the policy response has in- creased. With new programs announced this week, our 2020 fiscal thrust estimate has increased to 2.6% of GDP. These measures do not include enormous public sector contingent commitments. This week, Italy announced enhanced loan guarantees (worth up to €400 billion) and the Fed detailed the same level as our baseline by the end of the year but de- lays the recovery one month to begin in June.
Table 1: Global real GDP
Forecast
Alt.
scenario
%mm
%3m3m
%mm
%3m3m
programs scheduled to provide up to $2.3 trillion in credit to February
-3.7
-3.4
-3.7
-3.4
businesses and state and local governments in which the US March
-5.0
-14.7
-1.0
-10.0
Treasury provides credit protection. April
-7.0
-31.5
-7.0
-23.6
May
13.0
-28.4
-3.0
-31.0
Looking for first-out signs for China June
1.1
-12.6
11.0
-26.4
July
0.6
29.4
2.0
-2.1
Data watching for China takes on added importance given its August
0.6
33.7
0.9
35.1
potential to provide a template for what to expect as success- September
0.2
25.6
0.6
41.2
ful containment policies are eventually lifted elsewhere. Next October
0.8
7.3
0.7
28.0
week’s releases are likely to underscore how strong growth November
0.8
6.7
0.6
10.7
rates can become as activity resumes, even if normalization is December
0.8
7.9
0.8
8.7
incomplete. While we believe that domestic spending re- mained depressed in March, and external demand will remain depressed for at least another few months, we forecast a 35%m/m jump in industrial production and 60%m/m surge in retail sales (Figure 2). How much to extrapolate the China recovery to elsewhere is debatable. China’s transition from virus suppression to mitigation is supported by heightened surveillance policies. The population is being divided into groups that limit freedom of movement, with enforcement supported by widespread temperature checks (upon entering buildings and in the transportation system), extensive contact tracing through CCTV, facial recognition, and monitoring of mobile devices.
Figure
2:
China
IP
and
retail
sales
Index,
Dec
2019=100;
Mar
20
fcst
boxed
110
100
90
IP
80
70
60
50
Retail
sales
40
Jan
19
Apr
19
Jul
19
Oct
19
Jan
20
Source:
J.P.
Morgan
Time is GDP While we continue to forecast a widespread move away from virus containment beginning in May, the exact timing of this shift will play a key role in determining global growth rates for this quarter and next. To highlight this point, we have compared the monthly profile embedded in our global GDP outlook with an alternative scenario that leaves global GDP at Source:
J.P.
Morgan
This modest change produces a far more volatile growth path, with a much larger drop this quarter followed by a stronger rebound the next (Table 1). Even though GDP ends the year at the same level, the alternative path incorporates a bigger loss in global output as the recovery takes hold more slowly.
A different trickle-down theory While the impact of DM liquidity support has so far largely been limited to investment-grade credits, it is trickling down to EM assets as it boosts risk appetite. This support, along with increasing signals from EM central banks that they are willing to temporarily suspend institutional restraints and pro- vide unconventional support to government and corporate bond markets, has fashioned a semblance of order in EM markets. Indeed, credit spreads have eased and exchange rates have appreciated from the lows in late March. The seeming calm in EM markets should not, however, be taken as a sign that the underlying stress has eased and one can easily envis- age another material step down in asset prices if the EM cen- tral banks, governments, and the IMF do not follow through on expectations for more comprehensive and extensive liquid- ity backstop arrangements.
OPEC+ agrees on output cuts Although no formal agreement has been announced, Saudi Arabia and Russia together with other members of the OPEC+ alliance have reportedly agreed to slash output by about 10 mbd (10% of global pre-crisis supply) in May and June. The alliance called on the US and Canada and other producing countries to cut another 5 mbd when G20 energy ministers meet on Friday. The OPEC+ decision is in line with our view that global output needs to be taken down by 7-10
mbd over the next three months just to prevent world storage capacity being hit that could force Brent to drop below $10/bbl in the near term. A cut of 10 mbd would normalize spare storage by July that, in turn, could push prices to around $40/bbl by the second half of the year when the global econ- omy is expected to start recovering.
Japan: deeper recession, bigger stimulus This week, Japan finally declared a monthlong state of emer- gency for seven prefectures (including Tokyo) that comprise about half of Japan’s GDP. In response, the Cabinet approved a FY2020 fiscal package worth ¥108tn (19.4% of GDP), though the direct support through the government’s general account supplementary budget represents only ¥16.7tn (3.0% of GDP). We now see a fiscal thrust of 0.9%-pt (up from 0.7%-pt) for 2020 and 0.1%-pt (up from 0%-pt) for 2021—an outlook that still pales in comparison to the huge fiscal stimu- lus programs being enacted elsewhere. We also see real GDP plunging 17% ar this quarter. Compared to the US and Euro area, the voluntary nature of Japan’s lockdown is expected to produce a milder growth shock, but also runs the risk of a more damaging outbreak that could ultimately result in a worse macroeconomic outturn. We pencil in only a modest rebound in 2H20.
We expect the much weaker GDP trajectory to push Japan back into deflation for the first time since August 2013. We now forecast core CPI inflation (using the BoJ’s preferred measure) to dip just below zero later this year. The failure to build a lasting return to inflation should compel the BoJ to rethink its policy stance at its April 28 meeting. Prior to the pandemic, the BoJ had been reluctant to push rates more deeply negative, fearing the impact on bank lending. Rate cuts may still be a bridge too far.
Pandemic delays Brexit transition To date, the UK has resisted the idea that the COVID-19 out- break meant the end of the Brexit transition period would have to be delayed. But with no bandwidth available on the EU side for that discussion, and with UK PM Johnson hospi- talized, the need to create more time for discussion looks in- creasingly inevitable. Under the existing Withdrawal Agree- ment, a decision to extend the transition has to be taken by the end of June. We expect the UK to push for just a six-month delay, but think the most likely outcome is that both sides ultimately agree to a one-year extension proposed by the EU.
EMEA: Multiple tools for multiple objectives EM EMEA continues to ease monetary policy in response to a bleak growth outlook and rising financial stability risks. But these actions have tended to weaken currencies and fuel capi- tal outflows. Some innovative uses of toolkits have resulted, with lending facilities and QE supporting market functioning and fiscal policies. Short-end policy rate moves have reflected different tolerances across the region for currency deprecia- tion. The most extreme case this week occurred in Hungary, where the NBH simultaneously hiked and eased: raising over- night and weekly lending rates while expanding QE and lend- ing schemes. Its approach resembles those taken by central banks in Romania and Turkey, which have a long history of direct liquidity management and temporary rate hikes to ad- dress currency weakness. The SARB has been more willing to accept FX weakness given South Africa’s deteriorating out- look, and Poland’s NBP was able to deliver a surprise 50bp rate cut this week while also adding state-guaranteed bonds to its pool of QE-eligible assets. In Israel, the BoI cut 15bp to a record low of 0.1%—likely its effective lower bound—and also announced a small business credit facility.
Contrasting pandemic policies in LatAm Policy responses to the pandemic have varied across Latin America. Erratic approaches by both Brazil and Mexico have negative implications for the timing and magnitude of their eventual recoveries. In Mexico, incoming hard data for Feb- ruary reveal that the shock from Asia had already rippled through supply chains in 1Q. The combination of a muddled public health response matched by a disappointing economic plan appears likely to delay the 2H recovery, prompting us to revise down 2020 growth another half a percent, to -7.5%. In Brazil, President Bolsonaro has criticized his health minister and the decision by some state governors to keep social dis- tancing measures through April. Meanwhile, the Congress is now voting on its own measures without the support of the government. This lack of cohesion risks reducing the effec- tiveness of measures taken, thereby prolonging the crisis in Brazil and adding to the downside risks to growth. Policy responses have been stronger and more coherent in the Ande- an market-based economies. Yet even these may face down- side risks as quarantines are extended.
Editor:
Gabriel
de
Kock
(1-212)
622-6718
gabriel.s.dekock@jpmorgan.com
Carlton
Strong
(1-212)
834-5612 carlton.m.strong@jpmorgan.com
Joseph
Lupton
(1-212)
834-5735 joseph.p.lupton@jpmorgan.com
Global
economic
outlook
sum- mary
April
9,
2020
Global economic outlook summary Real GDP Real GDP Consumer prices
%
over
a
year
ago
%
over
previous
period,
saar
%
over
a
year
ago
2019
2020
2021
4Q19
1Q20
2Q20
3Q20
4Q20
1Q21
4Q19
2Q20
4Q20
2Q21
Canada
1.6
-3.3
2.7
0.3
-5.5
-18.5
10.0
5.0
4.0
2.1
1.5
2.1
2.2
Argentina
-2.2
-4.5
↓
1.7
↑
-3.9
-7.0
↓
-16.0
↑
9.0
↓
1.0
↓
1.5
↑
52.2
53.1
41.2
35.5
Brazil
1.1
-3.2
2.4
2.0
-6.0
-20.0
11.5
4.0
2.8
3.4
2.6
3.0
4.0
Chile
0.8
-2.0
2.7
-15.5
3.0
-16.0
24.0
3.0
1.0
2.7
3.1
↓
3.2
↓
3.2
↓
Colombia
3.3
-2.5
2.4
1.9
-4.5
-19.0
10.0
5.0
2.8
3.8
3.3
3.4
3.6
Ecuador
0.1
-2....
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